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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order dismissing the Information 
charging Phillip Milton Ruggiero with three counts of preparing false evidence 
based on the court's erroneous conclusion that Ruggiero's conduct was 
protected by the First Amendment. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In Ada County Case No. CR-MD-2011-13936, the state charged Ruggiero 
with stalking. (See R., p.80.) In that case, three letters were submitted to the 
magistrate that were typewritten and were purportedly from Lisa Roggenbuck, 
the victim of the alleged stalking, a "Spearmint Rhino Bouncer," and Jenn 
Higginson. (R., pp.11-13, 80.) All three letters support the proposition that 
Ruggiero was not guilty of the stalking charge alleged in Case No. CR-MD-2011-
0013936. (Id.) 
Based on the three letters submitted in Case No. CR-MD-2011-0013936, 
the state in this case charged Ruggiero with, and he was bound over to district 
court on, three counts of preparing false evidence in violation of I.C. § 18-2602. 
(R., pp.41-43.) In district court, Ruggiero filed a motion to dismiss arguing "there 
was not substantial evidence presented at the preliminary hearing ... that the 
defendant committed the crime for w~1ich he has been held to answer." (R., 
pp.60-61; see also pp.63-68 (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss).) 
The court conducted a hearing on Ruggiero's motion. (See generally Tr.) 
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Three days later, Ruggiero filed a "Supplemental Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss," asserting I.C. § 18-2602 is unconstitutional. (R., pp.85-
90.) More specifically, Ruggiero argued the statute (1) infringed upon his First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech, and (2) is "void for vagueness and thus 
invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" (R., 
pp.85-90.) The district court concluded the statute violated Ruggiero's First 
Amendment rights, concluding "I.C. § 18-2602, in the context of criminalizing a 
false or forged letter sent to a judge who is not ethically permitted to consider the 
ex parte communication for any reason punishes falsity alone and runs afoul of' 
the United States Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 
2537 (2012). (R., p.102.) The court, therefore, granted Ruggiero's motion to 
dismiss. (R., p.102.) 
The state filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.103-106.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in granting Ruggiero's motion to dismiss after 
erroneously concluding that his alleged acts of preparing false evidence were 
protected by the First Amendment? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Granting Ruggiero's Motion To Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
The state charged Ruggiero with three counts of preparing false evidence 
in violation of I.C. § 18-2602 for submitting three letters to the magistrate 
presiding over I-1is misdemeanor stalking case that falsely purported to be from 
three different individuals offering information indicating that Ruggiero was not 
guilty of the charged stalking offense. Ruggiero moved to dismiss the charges, 
arguing, in part, that I.C. § 18-2602 is an unconstitutional infringement on First 
Amendment rights and void for vagueness. (R., pp. 85-90.) The district court 
granted Ruggiero's motion to dismiss, reasoning: "As applied in this instance, 
I.C. § 18-2602 is being used to punish a false statement which could not be used 
in evidence and which could not be used to gain any material advantage." 1 (R., 
p.101.) "Thus," the court concluded, "I.C. § 18-2602, in the context of 
criminalizing a false or forged letter sent to a judge who is not ethically permitted 
to consider the ex parte communication for any reason punishes falsity alone 
and runs afoul of' the Supreme Court's opinion in Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537. (R., 
p.102.) 
1 While Ruggiero seemed to argue that I.C. § 18-2602 is facially unconstitutional, 
the district court's ruling was based on an as-applied determination. (R., p.101 
("As applied in this instance, I.C. § 18-2602 is being used to punish a false 
statement which could not be used in evidence and which could not be used to 
gain any material advantage.").) It is this ruling that the state challenges on 
appeal; however, any claim that I.C. § 18-2602 is facially invalid also lacks merit 
because I.C. § 18-2602 does not prohibit any constitutionally protected conduct. 
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The district court's ruling was erroneous because Ruggiero's alleged 
conduct, prohibited by I.C. § 18-2602, is not protected by the First Amendment. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct App. 2001). 
C. Ruggiero's Alleged Acts Of Preparing False Evidence Are Not Protected 
Bv The First Amendment 
Idaho Code§ 18-2602 states: 
Every person guilty of preparing any false or antedated book, 
paper, record, instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with 
intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced, for any fraudulent or 
deceitful purpose, as genuine or true, upon any trial, proceeding or 
inquiry whatever, authorized by law, is guilty of [a] felony. 
The district court concluded that application of this statute, as applied to 
the state's allegation that Ruggiero submitted false letters to the presiding judge 
regarding the merits of the stalking charge in Case No. CR-MD-2011-13936, was 
unconstitutional because it was "being used to punish" "falsity alone" since the 
judge would not be "ethically permitted to consider the ex parte communication 
for any reason." (R., pp.101-02.) According to the district court, this "runs afoul" 
of the Supreme Court's opinion in Alvarez, supra. (R., p.102.) The district 
court's interpretation of I.C. § 18-2602 was erroneous and its reliance on Alvarez 
misplaced. 
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"As a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has 
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content." Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2543 (quotations, brackets, and 
citation omitted). Thus, content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively 
invalid and will not be upheld unless the government can demonstrate the 
restrictions comport with the constitution. ~ at 2544. These principles are not 
threatened by I.C. § 18-2602 because the statute does not "restrict expression 
because of its message." ~ at 2543 It restricts preparing false evidence "with 
intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced for any fraudulent or deceitful 
purpose, as genuine or true, upon any trial, proceeding or inquiry ... authorized 
by law." I.C. § 18-2602. Thus, contrary to the district court's reasoning, the 
statute does not penalize "falsity alone." Whether the magistrate to whom the 
letters were addressed could have considered them is completely irrelevant to 
Ruggiero's intent in submitting the letters, which is what the statute criminalizes. 
The First Amendment does not protect the creation of false evidence with intent 
that it be considered by a court. Alvarez does not compel a different conclusion. 
At issue in Alvarez was the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act of 
2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b), which reads: 
(b) FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT RECEIPT OF MILITARY 
DECORATIONS OR MEDALS. - Whoever falsely represents 
himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any 
decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces 
of the United States ... shall be fined under this title, imprisoned 
not more than six months, or both. 
6 
Alvarez at 2543 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 704(b)). Subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. § 704 
further provides for enhanced penalties where the representation relates to a 
Congressional Medal of Honor. 18 U.S.C. § 704(c)(1). Alvarez at 2543. 
Alvarez challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 704 after the 
Government filed charges against him for telling fellow board members of the 
Three Valley Water District Board, wr1ich is a governmental entity, that he was 
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. Alvarez at 2542. In considering 
Alvarez's First Amendment challenge to the Stolen Valor Act, the Court found the 
Act "targets falsity and nothing more." & at 2545. The Court explained: 
The Act by its plain terms applies to a false statement made at any 
time, in any place, to any person. . . . [This] sweeping, quite 
unprecedented reach of the statute puts it in conflict with the First 
Amendment. Here the lie was made in a public meeting, but the 
statute would apply with equal force to personal, whispered 
conversations within a home. The statute seeks to control and 
suppress all false statements on this one subject in almost limitless 
times and settings. And it does so entirely without regard to 
whether the lie was made for the purpose of material gain. 
Alvarez at 2547 (citations omitted). 
The differences between the Stolen Valor Act and I.C. § 18-2602 are 
readily apparent. Unlike the Stolen Valor Act, I.C. § 18-2602 does not prohibit 
specific speech on "one subject in almost limitless times and settings" and 
"without regard to whether the lie was made for the purpose of material gain." 
Nor does I.C. § 18-2602 target "falsity alone." As noted, its reach is limited to a 
specific setting where the statement is offered for a particular purpose. The 
district court's reliance on Alvarez to support the conclusion that I.C. § 18-2602 
violates the First Amendment was erroneous. 
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Further, as recognized by the Court in Alvarez, there are circumstances 
where false speech may be prohibited. 132 S.Ct. at 2546. The most relevant 
examples to this case are those statutes that prohibit perjury and other 
fraudulent statements. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2544, 2546. Perjury statutes are 
"unquestion[ably] constitutional[ ]" because "[p]erjury undermines the function 
and province of the law and threatens the integrity of judgments that are the 
basis of the legal system." lfl at 2546 (citations omitted). Similarly, "[s]tatutes 
that prohibit falsely representing that one is speaking on behalf of the 
Government, or that prohibit impersonating a Government officer, also protect 
the integrity of Government processes, quite apart from merely restricting false 
speech." lfl The same can be said of I.C. § 18-2602. Preparing false evidence 
"with intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced, for any fraudulent or 
deceitful purpose" in a proceeding authorized by law "undermines the function 
and province of the law" and impairs the "integrity of Government processes." 
As such, the prohibition on such conduct is constitutionally permissible. 
The district court's conclusion that application of I.C. § 18-2602 to 
Ruggiero's actions penalizes falsity alone and was therefore an unconstitutional 
infringement on Ruggiero's First Amendment rights was erroneous. The district 
court's order dismissing the charges against Ruggiero should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's Order 
Re: Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this 17th day of January 2013~~ 
I ----~ 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Dept'.lty Attorney General 
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